This is definitely worth reading if you’re staying on top of ADS-B’s security concerns and solutions. Timothy Timmons (Embry Riddle Aeronautical University) wrote this excellent white-paper.

From his abstract:

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B is one, if not the most, essential component of the FAA’s NetxGen National Airspace (NAS) transformation.  NextGen is the biggest paradigm shift in the NAS since the introduction of radar following the end of World War II.  The technology in ADS-B will radically change how aircraft are tracked by Air Traffic Control (ATC).  Instead of interrogation by ATC radar based ground stations the ADS-B system depends on the aircraft to broadcast its position utilizing an internal GPS receiver.  ATC will be able to track aircraft positions with substantially more fidelity than previously possible with radar.  This fidelity promises greater airspace capacity while at the same time reducing NAS infrastructure cost by eliminating legacy radar stations.  But while the benefits of ADS-B are enticing there are serious vulnerabilities that will need to be addressed.  ADS-B relies on the GPS satellite constellation and the signals it produces.  These GPS satellites are unprotected and vulnerable to attack by hostile and rogue nation states as well as by terrorist organizations.  In addition the GPS signal is weak and susceptible to intentional and unintentional jamming.  The data traffic created by ADS-B is also very vulnerable to cyber attack due to its unencrypted and open architecture.  If exploited these weaknesses have the potential to wreak havoc on the NAS.  Steps can still be taken to make ADS-B redundant, secure, and dependable.  This paper explores the potential vulnerabilities of ADS-B and proposes several changes that can be realistically implemented to improve the system.

Source: ADSB: Flaws and Fixes – Tim’s Aviation Adventures


Filed under: News

Like this post? Subscribe to my RSS feed and get loads more!